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9/11 Commission Recommendations: Intelligence
Budget 
Summary
This report identifies the main recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with
respect to the intelligence budget.  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,
known as the 9/11 Commission, on July 22, 2004 recommended replacing the
Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director: (1) to oversee
national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the United States
government; and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee
agencies that contribute to it.  The National Intelligence Director would submit a
unified budget for national intelligence and would receive an appropriation for
national intelligence and apportion appropriated funds to appropriate agencies in the
intelligence community.  
The Commission also recommended that the top line of the intelligence budget
should be made public and that Congress should pass a separate appropriations act
for national intelligence rather than include funding for intelligence activities in the
appropriations acts for the Department of Defense and  those for other departments
that have elements of the intelligence community. In addition, the Commission
proposed that Congress should establish either a joint committee on intelligence or
a single committee in each House of Congress that combines authorizing and
appropriating authorities.
This report also describes the intelligence budget process under current law to
to explain the effect of these recommendations and presents the current budget
authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as budget provisions in two
bills, S. 2774 and H.R. 5040, that include all Commission recommendations.   
This report will be updated to reflect major legislative developments. 
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1 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, § 13.2,  411(Official Government Edition 2004) (hereinafter
9/11 Commission Report).
2 Id. at 412. 
3 Id. at 416.
4 Id. § 13.4 at 416.
5 Id. at 409; section 103 of the National Security Act, ch. 343 (1947), 50 U.S.C. 403-3,
grants these three responsibilities to the Director of Central Intelligence.
9/11Commission Recommendations:
Intelligence Budget 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, known as the 9/11 Commission,
on July 22,  2004 recommended replacing the Director of Central Intelligence with
a National Intelligence Director: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on
specific subjects of interest across the United States government; and (2) to manage
the national intelligence program and oversee agencies that contribute to it.1   The
National Intelligence Director (NID) would submit a unified budget for national
intelligence that reflects priorities chosen by the National Security Council and an
appropriate balance among the varieties of technical and human intelligence,
collection, and analysis.  The NID would receive an appropriation for national
intelligence and apportion the funds to the appropriate agencies, in line with that
budget, and have authority to reprogram funds among the national intelligence
agencies to meet any new priority.2  
The Commission also recommended that the overall amount of money being
appropriated for national intelligence no longer should remain secret and that
Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence.3 It also said that
because it believed that congressional oversight for intelligence is not functioning
adequately, Congress should establish either a joint committee on intelligence based
on the model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each
House of Congress that combines authorizing and appropriating authorities.4      
The Commission made this recommendation after it concluded that the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) has “too many jobs,” i.e., to run the Central Intelligence
Agency; to manage the loose confederation of 15 agencies or parts of agencies that
comprise the intelligence community; and to serve as the analyst in chief for the
government, sifting evidence and directly briefing the President as principal
intelligence advisor.5  Although, the Commission observed, the DCI is responsible
for the performance of the intelligence community, it asserted that the Director lacks
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authorities critical for any agency head including, among other things, control over
purse strings.6 
A brief discussion of the meanings of the terms “intelligence community” and
“intelligence budget” and a description of the current intelligence budget process
helps to explain the effect of these recommendations.
Intelligence Community.  Section 3a(3) of the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 401a, states that the term “intelligence community”
includes 
 the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, including the
Office of the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, the
National Intelligence Council, and such other offices as the
Director may designate; the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA];
the National Security Agency [NSA], the Defense Intelligence
Agency [DIA], the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
[NGA, formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency];
the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]; other offices of the
Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national
intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence
components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of the Treasury,
Department of Energy, and Coast Guard; the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the
elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned
with analyzing  foreign intelligence information; and such other
elements of any other department or agency as may be
designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director
of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or agency
concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.
Intelligence Budget.  The intelligence budget has three components, the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
Program.7  Section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,  50 U.S.C.
§ 401a, states that the term “National Foreign Intelligence Program ” refers to: 
all programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence
community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence
community designated jointly by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the head of a United States department or
agency or by the President.  Such term does not include
programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to
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acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of
tactical military operations by the United States armed forces.
The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) consists of intelligence
programs, projects, and activities undertaken in support of decisionmaking at the
national level and conducted by the CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO, NGA, and other agencies
in the Washington area.8  The Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) Program refer to intelligence-
related activities.  JMIP supports Defense Department-wide activities.  The TIARA
Program includes a “diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition programs
which are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct
support to military operations.”9  TIARA programs are conducted by intelligence
components of the Department of Defense in support of unified commanders and
subordinate echelons in conducting military operations in addition to meeting some
national level requirements.10
Current Intelligence Budget Process.11  A large majority of the budget
for the components of the intelligence budget ( NFIP, JMIP and the TIARA Program)
for the CIA, NSA, DIA, NRO, and NGA is hidden in the appropriations act for the
Department of Defense. 12  The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conduct extensive oversight
hearings, almost always in closed sessions, and report authorization bills and reports
with classified annexes.13  The Intelligence Committees do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over authorizations for intelligence program expenditures; the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services have jurisdiction over some intelligence
activities in the authorization acts for the Department of Defense and authorizations
for these activities are classified.14 
 
The Subcommittees on Defense of the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations review intelligence budget requests and approve funding levels.15
Funding for most intelligence activities included in the defense appropriations bills
is not identified as such either in legislation itself or in the accompanying reports, but
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does appear in classified annexes to the reports which Senators and Members of
Congress can read  under guidelines designed to protect secrecy.16     
It has been estimated that more than 85% of the intelligence budget is executed
by agencies not under control of the Director of Central Intelligence.17  The
appropriation in the DOD appropriations act for NFIP agencies, including the CIA,
is given directly to the Secretary of Defense, who disburses  appropriated funds to the
various agencies, including NFIP’s largest ones, the National Security Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,18
entities located in the Department of Defense.
The remaining portion of the budgets for intelligence elements, such as those
in the FBI in the Department of Justice and in the Departments of State, Treasury,
and Energy, is funded in appropriations acts for the departments of which they are a
part, but all of these combined represent a small percentage of total intelligence
expenditures.19 
Current DCI Budget Authorities.  The 9/11Commission asserted that, “The
only budget power of the DCI over agencies other than the CIA lies in coordinating
budget requests of the various intelligence agencies into a single program for
submission to Congress.”20  Nonetheless, a recitation of budget authorities that have
been granted to the Director by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and
by Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended by Executive Order
13355 of August 27, 2004, reveals that the DCI has additional budget authorities.
Authorities granted in the National Security Act include:
section 103(c)(1) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. §  403-
3(c)(1)(A), which authorizes the DCI “to facilitate the
development of an annual intelligence budget”;  
section 104(b), 50 U.S.C. § 404(b), which requires the DCI “to
prepare and approve all budgets for each of the intelligence
community agencies that comprise the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP),” an aggregation of budgets of the
15 agencies, including the CIA, that comprise the intelligence
community;  
section 104(c), 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(c), which provides that, “No
funds made available under the National Foreign Intelligence
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Program may be reprogrammed [i.e., shifted between programs,
projects, or activities within a single appropriations account] by
any element of the intelligence community without the prior
approval of the Director of Central Intelligence except in
accordance with procedures issued by the Director.  The
Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director of Central
Intelligence before reprogramming funds made available under
the Joint Military Intelligence Program”;
section 104(d), 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(d), which provides that the
DCI, “with the approval of the Director of Management and
Budget, may transfer funds [i.e., shift from one appropriations
account to another] appropriated for a program within the
National Foreign Intelligence Program to another such program
and, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
Director and the heads of affected departments and agencies,
may transfer personnel authorized for an element of the
intelligence community to another such element for periods up
to a year.”  This authority is granted subject to some conditions,
such as that no transfer of funds or personnel from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation can be involved and that no transfer can
take place if the secretary or department head objects to the
transfer.  Authority to object may not be delegated, except the
Secretary of Defense may delegate it only to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. 
On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 1335521
“Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community” that amended Executive
Order 12333 “United States Intelligence Activities” of December 4, 1981, as
amended.22  Section 3 “Strengthened Control of Intelligence Funding” of Executive
Order 13355 amended section 1.5 (n), (o), and (p) of Executive Order 12333, to
provide that:
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence.  In order to discharge
the duties and responsibilities prescribed by law, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible directly to the President
and the NSC [National Security Council] and shall: . . .
(n)(1) Develop, determine, and present with the
advice of heads of departments or agencies that have
an organization within the intelligence community,
the annual consolidated NFIP [National Foreign
Intelligence Program] budget.  The Director shall be
responsible for developing an integrated and balanced
national intelligence program that is directly
responsive to the national security threats facing the
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United States.  The Director shall submit such budget
(accompanied by dissenting views, if any, of the head
of a department or agency that has an organization
within the intelligence community) to the President
for approval; and 
(2) Participate in the development by the
Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the
Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
Program.
(o)(1) Transfer, consistent with applicable law
and  with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, funds from an appropriation
for the NFIP to another appropriation for the NFIP or
to another NFIP component;
(2) Review, and approve or disapprove,
consistent with applicable law, any proposal to: (i)
reprogram funds within an appropriation for the
NFIP; (2) transfer funds from an appropriation for the
NFIP to an appropriation that is not for the NFIP
within the intelligence community; or (iii) transfer
funds from an appropriation that is not for the NFIP
within the intelligence community to an appropriation
for the NFIP; and
(3) Monitor and consult with the Secretary of
Defense on reprogrammings or transfers of funds
within, into, or out of, appropriations for the JMIP
and the TIARA Program. 
(p)(1) Monitor implementation and execution of
the NFIP budget by the heads of departments or
agencies that  have an organization within the
intelligence community,  including, as necessary, by
conducting program and performance audits and
evaluations; 
(2) Monitor implementation of the JMIP and the
TIARA Program and advise the Secretary of Defense
thereon;
(3) After consultation with the heads of relevant
departments, report periodically, and not less often
than semiannually, to the President on effectiveness of
implementation of the NFIP Program by organizations
within the intelligence community, for which purpose
the heads of departments and agencies shall ensure
CRS-7
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that the Director has access to programmatic,
execution, and other appropriate information.  
Legislation Addressing All Commission Recommendations.  On
September 7, 2004, Senator John McCain and cosponsors introduced the 9/11
Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004, S. 2447, 108th Cong., 2d Sess.,
which, he said, “addresses each of the Commission’s 41 recommendations.”23 
Representative Christopher Shays and cosponsors introduced an identical bill, H.R.
5040, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., on September 9, 2004.   Section 111 “National
Intelligence Authority” of these bills would create the National Intelligence Authority
as an independent establishment in the executive branch of government.  Section 112
“National Intelligence Director” would establish the NID, who shall be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent fo the Senate.  Section 132
“Responsibilities of the National Intelligence Director”  would provide, with respect
to the intelligence budget, that the Director “shall (1) develop and present to the
President a unified budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States government; [and] (2) ensure a unified budget for the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States government that reflects an
appropriate balance among the varieties of technical and human intelligence methods
and analysis; . . .”
Section 133 “Authorities of the National Intelligence Director” has a number of
provisions relating to the intelligence budget, but before reciting them it should be
noted that S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would substitute the “National Intelligence
Program” in place of the “National  Foreign Intelligence Program,” which is defined
in 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 401a(6).
Section 102(6) “Definitions” of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 states that the term “National
Intelligence Program”--
(A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects,
and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; and
(ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities
(whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of
the  National Intelligence Authority, the Central
Intelligence  Agency [the text gives full names but
acronyms are used here], NSA, NGA, NRO, the
Office of Intelligence of the FBI, and the Directorate
of Information and Infrastructure Protection of the
Department of Homeland Security; but 
(B) does not refer--
(i) to any program, project, or activity
pertaining solely to the requirements of a
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single department, agency, or element of
the United States government; or 
(ii) to any program, project, or activity of
the military departments to acquire
intelligence solely for the planning and
conduct of tactical military operations by
the United States armed forces. 
The definition of the “national intelligence program” is more comprehensive than the
current definition of the “national foreign intelligence program” in section 3(6) of the
National Security Act.  Section 175 of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would amend section
3(6) to substitute the above definition of the NIP in place of the current definition of
the NFIP.  
Section 102(1) of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would define “intelligence” to include
“foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.”  “Foreign intelligence” would be
defined in section 102(2) as “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or
activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”  “Counterintelligence” would
be defined as “information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or
on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities” in section 102(3).  Section 102(5)
would provide that  “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national
security” (A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than
one department or agency of the government; and (B) do not refer to
counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the
National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly
provided for in this title.”  These definitions are identical to those in current law at
section 3 of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 401a.       
As noted earlier, section 133 of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 have a number of
subsections that relate to the NID’s authority over the budget for the National
Intelligence Program, specifically:
(b) Determination of budgets for NIP and other
intelligence. -- The NID [except for subsection titles which
generally use acronyms, the bill text uses full words but this
recitation uses acronyms] shall determine the annual budget for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States government by–
(1) developing and presenting to the President an
annual budget for the NIP, including, in furtherance of
such budget, the review, modification, and approval
of budgets of the intelligence community within the
NIP utilizing the budget authorities in subsection
(d)(1);
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(2) providing guidance on the development of
annual budgets for such elements of the intelligence
community as are not within the NIP utilizing the
budget authorities in subsection (d)(2);
(3) participating in the development by the
Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military
intelligence programs and activities outside the NIP;
(4) having direct jurisdiction of amounts
appropriated or otherwise made available for the NIP
as specified in subsection (e);   
(5) managing and overseeing the execution, and,
if necessary, the modification of the annual budget for
the NIP, including directing the reprogramming and
reallocation of funds, and the transfer of personnel,
among and between elements of the intelligence
community within the NIP utilizing the authorities in
subsections (f) and (g).
(c) Scope of NIP and JMIP.-- The NID and the
Secretary of Defense shall jointly review the
programs, projects, and activities [ppas] under the
JMIP in order to identify the ppas within the JMIP as
of the date of the enactment of this act that pertain to
national intelligence.  Any ppas so identified are to be
carried out instead within the NIP.
Section 184 “Termination of the Joint Military Intelligence Program” of S. 2774 and
H.R. 5040 would eliminate the JMIP effective October 1, 2005. 
(d) Budget Authorities.–(1)(A) The NID shall
direct, coordinate, prepare, modify, and present to the
President the annual budgets of the elements of the
intelligence community within the NIP, in
consultation with the heads of the elements.
(B) The budget of an element of the
intelligence community may not be
provided to the President for transmission
to Congress unless the Director has
approved such budget.
(2)(A) The Director shall provide
guidance for the development of the annual
budgets for such elements of the
intelligence community as are not within
the NIP;
CRS-10
(B) The heads of the elements of the
intelligence community referred to in
subparagraph (A) shall coordinate closely
with the Director in the development of the
budgets of such elements, before the
submission of their recommendations on
such budgets to the President.
(e) Jurisdiction of Funds under the
NIP.–Notwithstanding any other provision of law and
consistent with section 504 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 414), any amounts
appropriated or otherwise made available for the NIP
shall be appropriated to, and under the direct
jurisdiction of, the NID.
(f) Role of Reprogramming.–(1) No funds under
the NIP may be reprogrammed by any element of the
intelligence community within the NIP without the
prior approval of the NID except in accordance with
procedures issued by the Director. 
(2) The Director shall consult with the
appropriate committees of Congress
regarding modifications of existing
procedures to expedite the reprogramming
of funds within the NIP.
(g) Transfer of funds or personnel within the
National Intelligence Program.– (1)(A) In addition to
any other authorities available under law for such
purposes, the NID, with the approval of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, may
transfer funds appropriated for a program within the
NIP to another such program and, in accordance with
procedures developed by the NID and heads of the
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer
personnel authorized for an element of the
intelligence community to another such element.
(B) The NID may delegate a
duty of the Director under this
subsection only to the Deputy
National Intelligence Director.
(2) A transfer of funds or personnel
may be made under this subsection only if–
(A) the funds or personnel
are being transferred to an
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activity that is a higher priority
intelligence activity;
     (B) the need for funds or
personnel for such activity is
based   on  unfo res e e n
requirements; and 
(C) the transfer does not
involve a transfer of funds to the
Reserve for Contingencies of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 133(g)(2) of H.R. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would continue in identical
language three conditions on the authority of the NID to transfer funds or personnel
that currently apply to transfers by the DCI in section 104(d)(2) of the National
Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(c), but would omit two conditions, one
relating to the FBI and the other relating to objections to transfers, that now apply.
Section 104(d)(2) of the 1947 Act states that, “A transfer of funds or personnel may
be made under this subsection only if– (i) [the first three conditions are identical to
those in section 133(g)(2)of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040]  . . . (iv) the transfer does not
involve a transfer of funds or personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigations
subject to paragraph (B); and (v) . . . the Secretary or head of the department which
contains the affected element or elements of the intelligence community does not
object to such transfer.”  Authority to object to a transfer generally may not be
delegated by a secretary or department head, but the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to delegate it only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 
  
Section 133(g)(3)(4) and (5), which would relate to the period of availability of
transferred funds and requirements for reporting transfers of funds and personnel to
some congressional committees, would be identical to corresponding sections of
section 104(d)(3), (4), and (5) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403-
4(d)(3),(4), and (5), that currently apply to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Section 161 “Availability to Public of Certain Intelligence Funding Information”
of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would require the President to disclose to the public for
each year after Fiscal Year 2005 (1) the aggregate amount of appropriations requested
in the budget of the President for the fiscal year concerned for intelligence and
intelligence- related activities of the United States government and for each element
or component of the intelligence community.  It would direct Congress to disclose
to the public for each year after Fiscal Year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds
appropriated by Congress for the fiscal year concerned for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. government and for each element or
component of the intelligence community.
Section 302 “Reorganization of Congressional Jurisdiction” of S. 2774 and H.R.
5040 would provide that the 108th Congress shall not adjourn until each House has
adopted necessary changes to its rules such that, effective at the start of the 109th
Congress jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials and
other matters related to intelligence shall reside in either a joint Senate-House
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authorizing committee using the model of the former Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, or a committee in each chamber with combined authorization and
appropriations authority.24  The proposed Joint Committee on Intelligence or the
House and Senate Committees on Intelligence would be required to have not more
than 9 members who would serve without term limits; at least one member of either
the Joint Committee or House and Senate Intelligence Committees must also serve
on the Committee on Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreign Affairs and at least one
member must serve on a Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations.  The Joint Committee or the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees would have authority to issue subpoenas, would have majority
representation that would not exceed minority party representation by more than one
member in each House; and would have a subcommittee devoted solely to oversight.
